

# Test and Evaluation of Visionic Systems: It's All in the Questions that You Ask

David C. Foyle, PhD <sup>1</sup> Richard L. Newman, PhD <sup>2</sup> Becky L. Hooey, MSc <sup>3</sup>


<sup>1</sup>NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA
 <sup>2</sup>Federal Aviation Administration, Renton, WA
 <sup>3</sup>San Jose State University at NASA Ames Research Center



# Outline



- Need for off-nominal testing
- E/SV issues "insight approach"
- E/SV and HITS scenario recommendations
- Test & evaluation philosophies
- Formal off-nominal method
- Off-nominal event examples





# **Off-Nominal Scenario Testing**



## CHALLENGE: Ensure that laboratory studies "scale-up" to fielded system





FAA problem of technical transfer from lab to field

- ASDE-X system, but general (FAA White Paper Parasuraman, Hansman & Bussolari, 2002)
- Advocate early HF input into "very system requirements"

## Software testing (esp. NASA space-related)

- Leveson (2001) advocated for off-nominal software testing (testing under unexpected conditions)
- What software should <u>not</u> do (negative requirements)
  - Avoided in software requirements, and
- Forbidden by some industry standards (not verifiable infinite testing) Result:
  - Nominal behavior is well-specified
  - Off-nominal behavior is incompletely specified

### Factor in aviation and space-mission accidents



# **E/SV Visionics Issues**



## **Informally-derived Issues - Examples**

"Informed, Insightful Researcher Analysis Approach"

### **Rotorcraft Civil Use of NVGs**

Problem: Distance and altitude estimation (safe clearance, landing) Reason: FOV, resolution, contrast Assessment: Radio tower -- Height above; distance from

### E/SV Usage

Problem: Altitude estimation (approach/landing) Reason: FOV Assessment: Objective SA probes, altitude callouts

T-NASA (Taxiway Navigation and Situation Awareness) System Problem: Compellingness and crew coordination Reason: Display formats, physical location/availability Assessment: Induced Captain/First Officer route mismatch



# **E/SV Visionics Issues**



## Informally-derived Issues - Examples (cont).

## **HUD Landing/Approach**

Problem: Compellingness and cognitive tunneling Reason: Display formats, perceptual mechanisms (differential motion) Assessment: SA probes (incursions), display format research

## **HUD Minimal Symbology Set**

Problem: Recovery from unusual attitude (UA) with full HUD symbology setReason: Format configuration clutterAssessment: Induce UA (via turbulence)

## **Formal Processes**

## **Functional Hazard Assessment (for Certification)**

Problem: Determine minor, major, hazardous, catastrophic hazards Reason: E.g., Misinterpretation; where in flight envelope Assessment: (US FAA AC-25.1309-1A) (e.g., absent vs. bad data)



# **E/SV Visionics Unresolved Issues**



#### **Simulator/Flight Test Participants**

Experienced vs. Inexperienced (Test Pilots vs. Operational Pilots) Pathway-in-the-sky displays Increased sensitivity as display experience increases

(Wilckens, 1973; Mulder & Mulder, 2004)

### **E/SV Flight Test Conditions**

Problem: Low-visibility *emulation*Reason: Simulators - are weather conditions realistic, validated?
Flight test emulated weather - Simulate IMC by VMC with hood, then with step change to VMC at DH
Flight test actual weather - In actual IMC with go-around; Safety?
Scheduling?
Exception: Burgess' 1994 EVS tests



# **Scenario Recommendations Formal Method**



## **Method: Characterize Study Problem on Four**

Dimensions (Newman, 2002)

# E/SV Systems:

## **Operational Scenarios**

Low-altitude phases of flight --

Terminal navigation, approach/landing, take-off/departure, etc.

## **Human Error Model**

Detection and recognition of external objects/threats

## **Test Objectives**

Target/hazard detection --

Runway incursions, uncharted towers, other objects

E/SV misalignment, Sensor boresight error

(McKay, Guirguis, Zhang & Newman, NATO RTO SCI/SET, 2002)

## **Test Criteria**

Reaction time, hazard/non-hazard assessment accuracy



# **Scenario Recommendations Formal Method**



## Advanced Navigation Displays (i.e., Highway-in-the-sky):

### **Operational Scenarios**

Low-altitude phases of flight --

Terminal area, complex patterns, high-density traffic

Approach/landing, take-off/departure

### **Human Error Model**

Procedural issues Situation awareness (detect unsafe situations - navigation blunders, loss of terrain separation) Compellingness (cognitive capture/tunneling)

#### **Test Objectives**

Procedures (HITS reconfiguration due to engine failure/maneuvering) Detection of off-nominal events (e.g., navigation blunders, diversions, stray aircraft)

## **Test Criteria**


Reaction time, flight technical errors (esp. turns), SA probes




# **Human-Centered Design Method**



Foyle et al., (1996) - SAE Transactions: Journal of Aerospace Hooey, Foyle, & Andre (2002) - NATO SET RTO MP-107







# **Off-nominal Method**





Taxiway Navigation and Situation Awareness (T-NASA) System

## **Off-Nominal method:**

- Medium-fidelity simulation (Foyle, Wilson, Hooey & Johnson, 2002)
- High-fidelity, full-mission simulation (Hooey, Foyle & Andre, 2000)
- Human sequential testing effects (e.g., memory, training, trust)
- Experimental design = "Art"
- Formal method needed

Off-Nominal Method: Foyle & Hooey (2003)



# **Two Philosophies of Scenario Development**



# Problem observed: Improper balance between nominal and off-nominal scenarios in human-in-the-loop testing

Philosophy #1: Nominal condition emphasis:

- Off-nominal events are very disruptive
- Must protect nominal condition data
- Can only be tested on very last trial
- Advanced avionics system -- prove it works well

("Engineering approach"):

- Goal of testing is to demonstrate benefits
- Off-nominal testing may contaminate nominal results



# **Two Philosophies of Scenario Development**



# Problem observed: Improper balance between nominal and off-nominal scenarios in human-in-the-loop testing

Philosophy #1: Nominal condition emphasis:

- Off-nominal events are very disruptive
- Must protect nominal condition data
- Can only be tested on very last trial

## Philosophy #2: Off-nominal events emphasis:

- Off-nominal events are the primary interest
- Tests should not waste time collecting nominal data
- Advanced alerting system -- prove it alerts user
- Goal of testing is to verify user response to alerting system
- 90-100% of trials incorporate alert -- so as to not waste sim time



**Integrating the Two Philosophies** 



Advantages of integrating two philosophical approaches - testing both nominal and off-nominal events

Nominal Conditions Both Nominal and Off-nominal Events Off-nominal Events



# **Integrating the Two Philosophies**



Advantages of integrating two philosophical approaches - testing both nominal and off-nominal events

## Nominal Conditions

- Normal usage assessment
- Typically encountered conditions - include wide range of routine scenarios
- Usage patterns, workload, efficiency
- Ensure robustness and system success

Both Nominal and Off-nominal Events







Advantages of integrating two philosophical approaches - testing both nominal and off-nominal events

Nominal Conditions

- Normal usage assessment

Both Nominal and Off-nominal Events

# Off-nominal Events

- Non-normal usage assessment
- Range from slightly "nonperfect" conditions to partial/full system failures
- Give insight into users' model of system and interactions (failures show user complacency or over-reliance)
- Issues addressed via system design changes, training, procedures





Advantages of integrating two philosophical approaches - testing both nominal and off-nominal events

## Nominal Conditions

- Normal usage assessment

# - User expectancy manipulation

- Manipulation of relative probabilities
- 80-90% nominal conditions
  normal usage
- Caveat: Type and severity of off-nominal event affects probability for "normal usage"

Human Factors

## Both Nominal and Off-nominal Events

- Comparative performance measurement
  - Assess amount of disruption due to off-nominal event (e.g., turbulence)
  - Provides quantitative assessment under worstcase fielded scenarios


# Off-nominal Events


### Non-normal usage assessment


### - Performance control

Nominal as control condition:


- User "on-task" in nominal
- Off-nominal data not because of "deviant" user









Human Factors






esearch and technolog




# **Incorporation into Experimental Design**






# **Incorporation into Experimental Design**





# **Incorporation into Experimental Design**





# **Off-nominal Event Examples**



### Human-system interaction class: Interactions with other

human agents in the system Constructs: Complacency, levels of processing Event: ATC issued erroneous taxi clearance Disruptiveness: <u>Low</u>

- Clearance always amended (whether or not noticed by pilot)
- Amended clearances typical in actual operation


Human-system interaction class: Failure of the system being tested
 Constructs: Crew interaction and display cross-checking
 Event: Partial failure of the system - Captain's HUD showed different
 route than First Officer's taxi map

### Disruptiveness: High

- Possible argument over correctness
- Could affect crew communication and teaming
- Could affect system trust; altering usage







NASA 227: TAXI TO

2037Z

# **Off-nominal Event Examples (cont.)**



Human-system interaction class: Interactions with other equipment or technologies
 Constructs: Complacency, trust, situation awareness
 Event: Aircraft taxied in front of ownship - not on taxi traffic display requiring braking (Surveillance system limitation)
 Disruptiveness: Moderate


- Emergency braking and higher physiological arousal
- Cause attributed to normal surveillance system limit
- Not attributed to system under test; Trust unaffected

## Human-system interaction class: Unexpected changes in the

environment or operations Constructs: Situation awareness, display capture Event: Unexpected taxiway stoplights requiring quick reaction/near-emergency stop

### Disruptiveness: Moderate

- Possibly high physiological arousal
- But low consequence of miss (go unnoticed)



# Summary



# Developed experimental method for off-nominal testing in human-in-the-loop evaluations

Off-nominal testing allows for:

- Understanding of the human-machine system under evaluation
- Uncover design issues that can be addressed
- Determination of training issues and procedures

## The method involves:

- Developing issues to be tested
- Define off-nominal events addressing those issues
- Estimating disruptiveness of events
- Incorporate into experimental design
  - Low and moderately disruptive off-nominal events incorporated (Minimal disruption of nominal trial dependent measures)
  - Highly disruptive, "truly surprising" event Single final trial



# Summary (cont.)



## **Off-nominal testing**

- Allows for more *robust* tests and evaluations
- May improve <u>technical transfer success rate</u> of systems and concepts from the laboratory to the field




# Summary (cont.)



## **Off-nominal testing**

- Allows for more <u>robust</u> tests and evaluations
- May improve <u>technical transfer success rate</u> of systems and concepts from the laboratory to the field

## **IT'S ALL IN THE QUESTIONS THAT YOU ASK**







# Test and Evaluation of Visionic Systems: It's All in the Questions that You Ask

David C. Foyle, PhD <sup>1</sup> Richard L. Newman, PhD <sup>2</sup> Becky L. Hooey, MSc <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA
 <sup>2</sup>Federal Aviation Administration, Renton, WA
 <sup>3</sup>San Jose State University at NASA Ames Research Center

